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THE UNWRITTEN LAW*
By W.

LEWIs ROBERTS

Professor of Law, University of Kentucky

The phrase, the unwritten law, which came into prominence
twenty-five or thirty years ago, gained wide circulation through the
press in connection with certan notorious murder trials. We have all
fieard of the unwritten law but we seek in vain for a statement of it in
our law books. All of us, however, have a fairly clear idea of its meaning. It has been the plea of justification offered in murder trials
where the slain man has 'been guilty of some moral offense against the
defendant or against some member of his family. The conduct of the
slain man turns popular sympathy from him and creates such sympathy for the slayer that the latter's acquittal meets with approval.
The ,application of the unwritten law is, in effect, a popular rising
above the law by juries *ho really interpret the will of the people.
The danger in such a course-lies in the possibility that disregard for
all law may be encouraged. The remedy is to be sought in removing
the causes which give rise to the occasions on which the unwritten
law is appealed to and in raising popular ideals to the standards set
by statutes.
Neither our statute law nor our common law recognizes any such
defense as that invoked in the unwritten law. The nearest approach
to it to be found in legal works or in court decisions seems to be
*(Published In the Louisville Courier-Journal, November 27, 1921.)
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a statement in the fourth volume of Blackstone's Commentaries,
where the learned writer discusses justification in homicide. After
considering the "cooling time" that should intervene to make a case
of manslaughter one of murder, he says: "So if a 'man takes another
in the act of adultery with his wife and kills him directly upon the
spot, though this was allowed by the law of Solon as likewise by the
Roman civil law (if thle adulterer was found in the husband's own
house), and -also among the ancident Goths, yet in England, it is not
absolutely ranked in the class of justifiable homicide, but it is manslaughter. It is, however, the lowest degree of it, and therefore in
such a case the court directed the burning of the hand to be gently
inflicted, because there could not be a greater provocation."
The common law as found in Blackstone, in the works of other
legal writers, and in our court decisions, and the statute law, which
includes not only the enactments of Congress, of our State legislatures,
and of the legislative departments of our municipalities, but also our
State and Federal Constitutions, are the only sources of law recognized by our lawyers and judges in the trial of cases. If we do not
find in either of these sources any authorization of a jury to acquit a
man when he is tried for killing one who has broken up his home or
has dishonored a member of his family, the question naturally arises
as to whether there is not another source of law. Repeated acquittals
by juries in such cases seem to lead us to the conclusion that there is,
or that possibly the juries themselves are really making law for each
particular case as it arises.
This is what really happens in criminal cases for the jury acquits
a man of the offense charged even though the judge lays the law down
flatly that the prisoner is guilty. The jury may disregard the law as
the judge sees it and apply the law as the jury sees it. There can be
no question as to the power of the jury to do this. They have had the
power to return such verdicts as they saw fit from early times.
Originally juries were selected from the localities where the offenses which gave rise to suits or prosecutions were committed. They
were selected because they were already familiar with the facts. The
judge instructed them as to the law involved and they made their findings wholly or in part on their own information concerning the case.
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This method gave the jury a great deal of power for it was very difficult for the court to say that a jury was giving a false verdict.
Whenever a judge was certain a false verdict was returned, he might
fine the members of the jury just as he did when they were guilty of
some misconduct. In one case recorded in the time of Queen Elizabeth the jury prepared two verdicts. They proposed to hand in one
if the judge would stand for it but if he would not, the other was to
be their verdict. The judge imposed a fine on them.
Then came the famous Bushnell's case in 1670, where the jurymen were fined because they refused to return a verdict as directed
by the court against one William Penn and others for unlawful as.
sembly and trespass. On appeal to the higher court it was settled
once for all that a judge could not fine a jury for returning a verdict
against the weight of evidence. The only remedy left was to sue the
jury for attaint. This, however, was not effective since the suit had
to be tried before a jury which was more than likely to acquit the
first jury of any offense. Bushnell's case really ended the attempt
on the part of the court to control a jury.
From that time to the present, trial by jury has been one of the
chief means of checking the exercise of arbitrary power on the part
of those in authority.
In colonial days the royal governers found very little satisfaction
in trying those who opposed their high-handed methods before juries
drawn in the colonies and they resorted to the expedient of sending
offenders to England for trial. This was one of the grievances of
which the colonists complained when they were about to take up arms
against the mother country. In the long run it has mattered little
what measures might be taken by those in power so long as those who
opposed them must be tried by juries drawn from the people themselves. Popular interests were sure to be well protected in the end,
for the people always had an effective veto in the jury system. The
jury has stood between the individual and the exercise of arbitrary
power. It has been the great bulwark of individual rights and
popular liberties.
Historically, the jury has played a greater part in criminal prosecutions than in the settlement of private disputes. This is partly due
to the fact that in civil suits if the jury goes against the weight of the
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evidence or seeks to make the laiw to suit itself, its power is limited
since the judge may set the verdict aside and order a new trial. This
is not possible in criminal cases because the United States Constitution
provides that the life of no one shall twice be put in jeopardy for the
same offense. Consequently, when a jury once acquits a prisoner, his
life has once been in jeopardy for that offense and the judge is powerless to set the verdict aside and order a new trial although the finding may have been clearly against the weight of the evidence and the
prisoner clearly guilty of the offense charged.
In a criminal trial the judge may tell the jury that the law is so
and so, and if they find certain facts to be true they will return a verdict of guilty, or a statute may embody the point of law involved in
the clearest language possible, nevertheless the jury may totally disregard both the judge's instructions and the statute and return a verdiet according to its own fancy. When they do this, they are really
making the law for the particular case. This is the prerogative of our
juries and-no one can punish them for finding as they do. They are
really the law makers of last resort in each criminal case.
This is undoubtedly the reason why in times past the AngloSaxon has so tenaciously clung to his right of trial by jury. It was
when Charles I. of England attempted to ignore the right to trial by
jury and to impose fines and punishments through the famous Star
Chamber court that the English people became thoroughly aroused,
overthrew the royal government, and established the Commonwealth.
Today jurymen are the judges of the facts presented at the trial.
They are no longer selected because they themselves are acquainted
with evidence in the particular case on which they are to pass judgment. They are now chosen rather because they are not familiar with
the facts and have not formed an opinion as to the rights of the respective parties or the guilt of the defendant. They are drawn from
the community at large each term of court and are supposed to be
representative citizens. Necessarily they bring with them a fairly accurate idea of public opinion. It is safe to say that they are influenced by public opinion and that they would not acquit a man
really guilty of murder if they did not have public sentiment behind
ii em.
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They really reflect'the popular will in each case as it is presented.
Consequently when we find juries repeatedly acquitting those charged
with killing because the slain man has been guiltyof a moral wrong,
we must conclude that it is the popular will that the killing is justified in such cases and that the defendants have defenses good as a
matter of law.
This is law making in which judges and lawyers have very little
to do. In fact, it is usually made in the face of instructions by the
presiding judge that the law is quite the contrary to that which they
have decided governs the particular case. The unwritten law then
comes directly from the people of the community and is a matter that
is entirely out of the hands of lawyers and judges as such.
It has been suggested that it is the function of the Legislature to
embody the will of the people in statutes and that since the unwritten
law apparently reflects the popular will in such cases, the Legislature
should incorporate it in our statutes. To do so, however, would seem
to be useless because juries would still have the power to say what the
law in the particular case is and would still be in a position to disregard the statute, if in the m eantime popular opinion should change
and demand that there should be convictions in such cases. If the
court should feel that the verdict should be set aside on motion of the
prisoner's counsel and a new trial be granted, a second-jury, reflecting the will of the people, would also find the defendant guilty. The
court would then conclude that the first jury was right and that the
particular case did not come within the provisions -f the statute. In
such a case the objection to a second trial that it would be putting the
life of the prisoner twice in jeopaidy contrary to the Federal constitution would not be raised since the new trial would be at the request
of the prisoner himself.
Furthermore, if it really is the function of the Legislature to
embody iii statutory forin the popular will wherever it makes itself
manifest, to be consistent, we should write upon our statute books a
law to the effect that our administrative officers may nullify or set
aside such laws as they see fit whenever in their judgment it is the
wish of the community that the enforcement of certain laws shall be
suspended. Such a suggestion may seem a little startling at first
thought but the French have a similar provision in their code. Cer-
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tain executive officers in France may suspend the enforcement of a
law under certain conditions, whenever such an emergency arises that
in their judgment it is expedi6nt to do so. In practice, we have the
same thing, for our administrative officers have the power not to enforce laws and they do avail themselves of this power whenever they
feel that non-enforcement will meet with popular approval. Then by
non-enforcement of laws through administrative officers, the people
have an effective means of vetoing measures that do not meet with
their approval; for successful enforcement of laws in the final analysis
depends upon the support of public opinion.
An executive officer is very certain to act, and promptly, if he
feels that the people demand it of him. He knows that if he does not,
his chances of retaining his office or of securing other public offices
depends upon his meeting with public approval. In fact, administrative officers are usually quick to respond to the spirit of the. times.
If they feel there is a demand for rigid enforcement of a measure, self
interest prompts their course of action. If they feel that enforcement
is likely to meet with real opposition, few have the courage to proceed
in it. When Lord North tried to Impose his unpopular stamp act
upon the American Colonies before the Revolution, he found that the
local officers on whom was placed the burden of carrk'ing out the act,
preferred to resign rather than to incur the hatred of their neighbors.
One naturally asks, then, what is the function of legislative enactments if they are not to reflect the popular will at all times? It has
been suggested that statutes are to set standards to which we wish to
raise popular ideals; in other words, that the work of the legislature,
apart from passing acts of a private nature, is standard setting. If
the standard is too far in advance of popular ideas there is a very
great possibility that the law will not accomplish its purposes. If
it is so far ahead of the times that people de not approve of it, it will
not be the law enforced by them through juries and executive officers
drawn from their midst.
If these premises are sound it must follow that it is not sufficient
to write a law tipon the statute books. As few laws enforce themselves the real work still remains to be done. Popular ideals must be
raised to the standard set by the statute so that public sentiment will
be behind its enforcement and nake administrative officials perform

The Unwritten Law
their duty in bringing those who violate the law before the courts and
also prompt juries to convict such offenders. This is especially true
where the, law is as far reaching as the prohibition legislation. If
there are communities that have not been brought to approve the
amendment and to live willingly by its provisions, it is clear that the
work of education is not yet complete. If we were to find that this
legislation were hailed with joy in every part of the country and no
effort were needed to enforce it, we should very properly conclude
that the legislation were either needless or might have been enacted
years before it was.
From the fact that to embody the so-called unwritten law in our
statute would be both useless and wrong on principle, it does not follow that there cannot be legislation that will help to lessen the occasions on which it will be appealed to. It is a goal worth working for,
as nearly everyone will agree that to allow an individual to take the
law in his own hands and to act as judge, jury and executioner at
one and the same time is contrary to the spirit of our laws, wrong on
principle, and :a real menace to society. Doubtless the unwritten law
never would have received the public sanction that it apparently has
in some quarters, had it been certain that victim of the one on trial
would.have been properly punished at the hands of the law so that the
act of the accused was wholly needless. Any measures that look towards the betterment of social conditions and morals are sure to work
towards this end.
A greater respect for law and government can be inculcated in
our citizens. Vice-President Sherman once said that respect for law
has built up this country of ours. He might have added that respect
for those in authority has played its part too. At the present time
we seem to be passing through a period of lawlessness and lack of respect for those in authority. A prominent government official under
the present national administration in an address recently delivered
before the American Bar Association deplored the present contempt
for law and the revolt against the spirit of authority. It would, indeed, be very interesting to know just how great an influence a book
written by this speaker had in bringing about this "present revolt
against authority." Surely he spared neither the art of the sophist
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nor that of the satirist to bring into contempt the one who then occupied the highest office in the land.
Those idealists who struggled to establish popular government
and thereby to put the enforcement of laws into the hands of the
people by means of jury trials and popular election of administrative
officers, saw the necessity of popular education and did all in their
power to promote it.
The task then is one of restoring at the present time the higher
ideals that prevailed before the war swung us into the present reign
of materialism. This is not wholly the task of the church and school
for every organization or lodge can play its part.

